Interrelated issues exist concerning cell understanding, quali ty, reliability, and safety. Reliability, the ultimate goal in using nickel-cadmium cells, is considered degraded due to quality deficiencies. Cell quality is hindered by a lack of understanding of cell electrochemical processes. Higher cell reject rates occur, and replacement cells are needed. The manufacturer has a backlog of orders, placing a strain upon cell availability. Accidents experienced with good cells place an even greater strain upon a full supply line beset by quality problems, exacerbating the existing quality degradation issue. Launch decisions on flight battery acceptability must be made in short time periods by management using the battery community's recommendations. This process is hindered by the lack of sound analytical techniques to accurately predict cell reliability and performance and by the lack of analytical tools which assure a good cell design. As a result of the current situation, the means to provide adequate data for judging flight cell acceptability on a timely basis is considered extremely tenuous, resulting in programs taking undefined risks, that in itself being a higher risk than desired.
Introduction
Degraded performance of nickel cadmium flight cells can adversely affect the mission reliability of billions of dollars worth of spacecraft and the retrieval of key science and space mission data. A spacecraft loss can dramatically affect space scientists who may have devoted a substantial portion of their career to one space mission, as well as others whose careers involve the application of space data.
Performance degradations experienced with the Gates aerospace nickel-cadmium cells were brought to the attention of NASA senior management by the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Steering Committee during the Annual Program Review in March 1988. During that meeting a special review by the Steering Committee was chartered by Mr. George Rodney, the Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance, to independently establish the risk of the suspect Gates Energy Products cells on NASA's upcoming flight programs. The approach used was to examine the cell design, the available test data, and severity of mission requirements in order to evaluate battery related mission risks for each of 19 programs affected. A final report was presented to senior NASA management in May 1988.
The reliability of NASA's current nickel-cadmium cells is considered degraded due to quality deficiencies. The term "reliability" usually refers to the outcome of the performance determination of a large number of test samples from a large lot of samples built to a carefully controlled process. With space hardware, however, the traditional use of the term lacks meaning as a consequence of the small number of samples involved. In this case, it is generally considered to mean an assessment of whether or not hardware can be expected to accomplish its intended function. This paper presents the important battery and cell problems, encompassing both categories --test failures and accidents --which were encountered during the past year. It is the intent here to address the practical issues facing programs which have to be considered in the development of a battery program strategy. While the NASA Battery Program, discussed in another paper at this conference, is designed to resolve some of the key issues, it is appropriate for the entire battery community to address these issues as well.
A key point which this paper shows is the interrelationships between cell understanding, reliability, quality, safety, and production line issues. These disciplines must be given strong consideration to best insure the resolution of battery and cell related problems. This paper focuses upon the problems of one program --the GRO (Gamma Ray Observatory) --as illustrative of those interrelationships. The fundamental categories of battery problems are illustrated by the events which occurred to GRO this past year. Those problems serve as a summary of current issues for the battery community to address, problems about which we must all be particularly vigilant.
In addition to the GRO problems, those encountered by other programs are briefly mentioned to give a complete accounting. As discussed in this paper, two major categories for examining issues are defined, namely, those which are:
(1) quality and design related, i.e., problems having inherent manufacturing process related issues with an impact on cell reliability and (2) accident triggered, or man induced, i.e., those operational issues having an impact on battery and cell reliability.
Test Problems
Gamma Rav Observatorv Program.-
The GRO macecraft costs the US $500 M d u s another $320 M for launch costs. US scientists have been involved with this mission up to 11 years of their career. The US space reputation, as always, is on the line, particularly for the performance of major observatories such a s GRO.
First review.-Based upon a very substantial, 25-30 year data base, the Steering Committee reported to NASA senior management in May 1988 that the GRO cells were expected to produce good flight results. The GRO cells contained the attractive design features of the NASA Standard that had been proven to be conducive to long cycle life times in low Earth orbit (LEO). Experience with the NASA Standard cell design shows it functioning satisfactorily in flight whenever the cells' manufacturing and testing processes had received proper control and attention, and when the manufacturer had followed the approved MCD's (Manufacturing Control Documents) [l] . At 3500 cycles, cell 4 s voltage rapidly descended to 1.418 volts, 59 mV below the average level (1.477 V) of three other "good" cells (39 mV lower than the 5-cell average voltage). Cell #1, at 1.435 volts, was 42 mV below the average of the three "good" cells. Although there is no specification value for voltage divergence, those values were considered excessive. A specification of 8 mV is used for cell matching purposes to install cells into a battery which indicates the importance attached to close matching of cell At 3512 cycles, Pack 6051A was removed from testing, its cells' capacities checked, the cells reconditioned, and then returned to test on January 7, 1989 at the VT = 6 level as described earlier. The test equipment was thoroughly checked out and determined to be functioning properly.
At 3880 cycles (January 26, 1989) a VT = 3 voltage control level (1.397 V) was initiated to attempt to recover the degraded cell 4 performance. The intent here was to control the divergence by lowering the VT limits and, once the divergence was controlled, to gradually return to VT = 6. Instead, cell 4 decreased again, this time to 1.347 volts. Cell number 1 returned to a performance level consistent with cells 2, 3, and 5.
At 3989 cycles, cell 4 degraded further to 1.200 volts, and the cell was removed from the pack on February 2,1989 for detailed investigative testing. Notice that at the VT = 3 level, cell 1 is now being controlled to operate at a lower voltage level than the voltage to which it had previously degraded, so this point does not indicate its recovery. Pack #/ 6051 A was returned to test after cell 4 removal and cycled for 62 cycles at VT = 3, then incrementally increased to VT = 4 (+68 cycles), 5 (+62 cycles), 6 (+61 cycles, February 21, 1989). As of the date of this paper's preparation, cell 1 has maintained a voltage level consistent with cells 2, 3, 5 , the difference among those 4 cells being only 2 mV, indicating cell 1's voltage recovery.
3A. Suspect Cell Quality/Design Issues

CELL OUALITY ISSUE:
The data above indicate anomalous performance characteristics with at least two cells. The question is whether the cell quality problem is lot generic or cell isolated. A decision was made for the COMSAT Laboratory in Clarksburg, Md. to perform a DPA on cell 4. Prior to the DPA, the cell was first reconditioned. The results of the DPA, at the time of this paper, revealed good cell capacity at 10 OC (64.02 Ah to 1.0 V and 65.13 Ah to 0.1 V). The charge retention and charge recovery tests did not indicate any presence of soft shorts. All chemical analysis Values were nominal. Based upon the test rates and temperatures used in the pack test, the results of the visual examination showed unanticipated separator degradation and excessive cadmium migration, also confirmed by SEM. As of this date, the analysis is proceeding, and therefore is incomplete, but at the present time, the absence of shorts indicates a possible generic lot problem.
Given the situation as described above, two important points can be derived conceming Lot 16s performance.
(1) FAILURE TOLERANCE ISSUE; Future power system design should address the provision for system tolerance of cell failures. sDecifically, it should address the question, "How can power systems be designed to be insensitive to cell failure such that one bad cell will not degrade the entire pack?"
Cell voltage divergences of the magnitude experienced with GRO cause great concern, particularly in voltage divergence sensitive power system designs where the VT charge method is used. In a sense, because there was every expectation that this lot of cells should have produced satisfactory performance but did not, the degradation of cell 4 casts a shadow upon many NASA programs. Clearly we can not guarantee that cells will never fail.
(2) SYSTEM DESIGNITEST PROCEDURE ISSUE:
Should flight power systems be designed to provide a reconditioning capability, recognizing that the design solution for LEO is more difficult than GEO? Or, if not provided, should testing in a non flight manner be excluded in the validation of flight hardware? Alternatively, does one deep discharge alter the cell's properties to a degree that subsequent test data can no longer be considered dependable?
The GRO test pack's electrochemical characteristics have been improved without having the provisions for a similar reconditioning capability in orbit. No means exists to establish the effect of the three reconditionings of cell 1 after cycle 3512. We must strive to structure our test programs to closely simulate the flight system and the flight operational procedures. The results from this pack's testing from here on can be misleading, in an optimistic sense, since reconditioning tends to temporarily improve cell performance.
CELL OUALITY MEASURE ISSUE;
What does the cell capacity test project regarding the expected life from cell I ? Is it a predictor of ill health or can it only be used to verify the death of a cell?
The meaning of capacity checks and the ability of that data to serve as a predictor of cell performance surfaced as a question. A good quality, commercial grade nickel-cadmium cell will exhibit a 7% open circuit stand capacity loss per month at the 10 OC temperature used in this test [2] . Cells 2 and 5 lost 10% and 9% respectively in 5 weeks, indicating nominal performance. Cell 3's loss was higher at 21% (assuming a fully charged cell). Does this forecast a premature loss in the cycle life performance of cell 3? It appears that the capacity checks are performed for information only without providing any hard technical value that constitutes valid accept-reject critena.
RELIABILITY TESTING SAMPLE ISSUE:
What is the proper test sample size and the optimal test approach? Two MPS (Modular Power System) power the spacecraft. Each M P S contains three batteries of 22 cells each. Because the GRO Power System was designed to tolerate one battery failure per M P S , the spacecraft has the capability to accept at least one cell failure without jeopardizing the mission. The question then is "What is the indicated reliability as shown by the test results?" Unfortunately, the small, 5-cell test hardware sample is not of great value in illuminating the anticipated cell failure rate with confidence --more test data are needed to produce a better statistical understanding.
All that can be stated from Lot 16's 5 cell test sample size is a reliability of no greater than 0.8 (1 in 5) during an operational duration of one half year. Should cell 1 be considered failed? After all, it did not exhibit performance characteristics comparable to the other cells, and it was restored to new life by an operational procedure that cannot be accomplished in flight. If so, the Lot 16 cell reliability is 0.6 at a half vear ~-T--of testing. That begs the question too, "What should be the definition of a failed cell?" If cell 1 is also considered anomalous, clearly the GRO is in jeopardy of even meeting its two year mission, let alone achieve the program desire to continue for 5 or more years. The risk which GRO undertakes, therefore, is a function of that error (or failure) rate as well as the influence of the failure of a single cell upon the life of the entire battery --a mission design and operational subject.
FLIGHT DATA ISSUE:
With recognition to the advancements in today's diagnostic technologies and digital logic, would it not be advisable to increase the health monitoring of individual cells and to provide additional operational control capabilities as preventive and remedial measures for cell failures while in flight?
Unfortunately, the batteries' flight data measurement capability on GRO is not as accurate nor as extensive as the ground system. Instead, in the absence of individual cell voltages, the spacecraft's instrumentation system uses voltage measurements only on a half battery basis which lacks the ground system's data granularity and capacity for examining the performance of individual cells.
3B. Accident Related Issues
LOT I6 HARDWARE SHIPMENT SAFETY ISSUE:
The results of the pack testing were subjected to question and analysis, too, due to physical damage incurred on the cells during shipment to Crane. Cell 4 had a damaged fill tube, and question arose whether the damage could have been conmbutory. A phenolphthalein leak check did not reveal any presence of KOH around the tube. Further, the damage did the preference is to discard the cells and start over. In the case of GRO, there was an insufficient cell throughput from the production line and insufficient time to wait for the fabrication of new cells.
The response in this case was to conduct a DPA (Destructive Physical Analysis). There was, however, a lack of confidence in the capability of a DPA to predict the anticipated life of the cells. The DPA did not reveal any conclusive evidence of value in the prediction of cell life. The cell's components visually appeared to be normal as well as chemically. The expected life from these cells is still unknown.
CELL DESIGN ISSUES:
There must be another variable in the cell reliability question that must be addressed but which is not being adequately considered. As mentioned, if one were to base performance expectations solely upon the data base, the anomalous results were a surprise to the NASA battery community. Therefore, there must be design and quality verification procedures consistent with this cell design for which the cell verification system does not provide a proper accounting. 
Consequences
In the case of GRO. the suacecraft was scheduled to be
LOT 17 CELL SAFETY ISSUE:
The question is, how do we launch a Preventative Offensive Activitv EQA) to avoid overcharge accidents? A test procedural error was experienced during the third shift when the Gates' test operator inadvertently overcharged 17 cells in Lot 17 at a C/2 rate for 42 minutes. Those cells were in a full state of charge at the time of the accident. This matter is considered a hardware safety issue which ultimately relates to quality and reliability, given the great demand on the production line's flight cells and general cell unavailability.
This lot had been yielding satisfactory performance and was clearly very much in demand due to problems with the other flight lot. The abused cells were considered to have been degraded in quality and unqualified for flight because of that test exposure history. The cell design has not been qualified by test to demonstrate a 5 to 10 year life after being exposed to cell stresses of that magnitude. Further, there is no precedent for the use in flight of abused cells. These cells were, therefore, considered to pose a sufficient risk for meeting the program's elecmcal power requirements for the 5 year m i ssion duration to the extent that they were not recommended for flight by the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery System Steering Committee. Gates is implementing safety preventative measures to avoid reoccurrences. DOD, 20 OC --was recommended as an added measure to evaluate cell quality, a preference since it provides data on a more rapid turnaround. The NASA Standard cell design (comprising unpassivated plates and 2505 separator) when manufactured properly, typically yields 2 years of LEO cycle life under the stress test. The stress data allows a better evaluation of the Lot 16 risk and helps to determine the expected cell performance and acceptability.
In the event that the Lot 16 cells do not appear desirable as a result of the stress test, replacement options were evaluated. It should be pointed out that the normally preferred standards for desirable hardware cell replacement options do not exist. The NASA battery community lacked the desired degree of confidence in suggesting these alternatives. The alternatives were limited to reshuffling available cells from other programs and the use of designs without an adequate data base.
The options recommended are shown in option is the use of a spare battery from another program, ERBS, having six years of activated storage life. Normally a cell or battery is to be avoided for flight use after three years of prelaunch activated life. Further, it is preferred to obtain cells for all batteries on one M P S from the same manufacturing lot.
Other Spacecraft
Geostationarv Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES).-
TEST ERROR ISSUE:
A Gates test operator accidentally overcharged 25 fully charged flight cells, and like GRO --during the third shift.
In September 1988 during acceptance testing, instead of discharging the cells, a 6 amp charging current (C/2 rate) was applied for 1 hour. Later, after the cells were discharged, 41 cells, 25 of which had been overcharged as discussed, were overdischarged for 4 hours at 6.0 amps. The cells were driven into reversal. All 41 cells were scrapped. Another group of 24 cells was overcharged at 1.2 amps for 5 hours, 15 minutes. A fourth group of 24 cells was overcharged at 1.2 amps for 3 hours, 15 minutes. The latter two groups were accepted.
n . -
More recently, during the manufacturing process of the Hughes Super Nickel-cadmium cells [3] which were being manufactured for test evaluation by NASA, an equipment malfunction, combined with procedural errors, was experienced. The cells were overcharged sufficiently during preacceptance testing that eight of the cells' cases bulged from pressures produced by high overcharge currents of an unknown magnitude. The magnitude of the pressure was unknown, but higher than the 65 psi specification value and in excess of the pressure instrumentation.
Additional safeguards were installed and personnel assigned to monitor the equipment on a 24 hour basis.
Hubble Space Te1escoDe.-
This was another overcharge accident.
In the spring of 1989, a 23 cell nickel-hydrogen battery was inadvertently subjected an overcharge current of 300 amps through an operator error. While a technician was attempting to troubleshoot, the switches were out of sequence, which by-passed the power supply's protective circuitry resulting in the high current for a short period of time, about 5 to 20 seconds. Damage to the interconnect connectors occurred, and one of the cells leaked through the Zitel seal. A DPA was conducted on that cell with no damage noted internally to the cell's components. The resolution was to implement a more rigorous start up procedure.
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle.-
COMPUTATIONAL ERROR:
A failure of a new design 350 AH silver zinc cell occurred in December 1988 when the electrolyte was noted to discharge through vents. This was an engineering development cell, and specifically a cell verification test. A crack was observed in the cell case. A Marshall Space Flight CenterflRW anomaly investigation team conducted an investigation into the process and quality assurance procedures at Yardney. The results of the investigation revealed adequate quality assurance procedures, but an inaccurate method to determine the amount of electrolyte was noted. Some constants were found to be in error which caused the excess electrolyte. The case tooling was also found to be inadequate to properly control the case wall thickness.
Magellan SDacecraft.-
TEST ERROR ISSUE:
In October 1988 at the Kennedy Space Center during the prelaunch checkout of the electrical power system, a set of connections was being made to verify the power control unit's performance prior to powering the spacecraft systems. There was restricted access to the equipment and limited visibility inside the forward equipment module where mating of five harnesses was required. A spacecraft f i e occurred as the result of a technician mating unmatched connectors. The use of differently keyed connectors was thought to prevent the inadvertent connection. The capability to mismate, however, was confmed by post-mishap testing. Fortunately, the battery in use was a unit designated for ground test purposes and was not a flight battery. Fortunately, too, the damage to the spacecraft was repairable, without incumng a delay in the launch. The postponement of the installation of flight batteries is an excellent procedure which we should ensure that is implemented on future programs.
The issue here is that we need to ensure that the advertised performance of hardware is real. Connections should not be made without visibility and with only the operator present during the conduct of key operations. Backup verification is essential. The connector harness was not protected by fusing.
Remedial Measures
As one remedial approach to resolve the lack of ground cell test data issue, NASA policy has been prepared to define test Traditionally, cell research focuses primarily on the development of greater performance,. i.e., higher power densities.
Hence, it typically has not addressed the current day-to-day category of problems such as those pertaining to quality and reliability matters and issues. More attention is beginning to be focused upon this matter as the issues become better surfaced. However, everyone in the battery community, whether govemment orindustry, must share a role in the resolution of these issues. Too much is at stake to do otherwise.
Summary
Interrelated issues exist conceming the cell production line though-put, cell electrochemical understanding, quality, reliability, and safety. This paper concentrated upon one program's problems to illustrate the interrelations of the issues with those diverse disciplines. The reliability of current nickel-cadmium cells is considered degraded due to quality deficiencies. Quality is hindered by a lack of cell understanding. Higher cell reject rates occur, and replacement cells are needed from a full manufacturing supply line.
Accidents experienced with good cells place an even greater strain upon a supply line beset by quality problems, exacerbating the existing quality degradation issue. Proper cell design is undefined, and success with the achievement of cell quality is achieved by manufacturing process controls which are inadequately implemented. Uniform test techniques are not performed across the battery community, and even the importance of testing is not fully accepted. Testing by programs is commenced too late to be of value in verifying cell quality. Some are even unconvinced of the importance of testing. The data base for cells is inadequate to serve as a suitable substitute for the lack of diagnostic predictive techniques. Launch decisions on flight battery acceptability must be made in short time periods by management using the battery community's recommendations. They are hindered by the lack of sound analytical techniques to accurately predict cell reliability and performance. As a result of the current situation, the means to provide adequate data for judging flight cell acceptability on a timely basis is considered extremely tenuous, causing programs to take higher risks than desired. Applied research must address the issue of the integration of theory, reliability, and quality to provide solutions that will benefit programs.
